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In 2015 over one million people crossed the Mediterranean 
to Europe in search of safety and a better life. Thousands 
died along the way. The MEDMIG project seeks to better 
understand these unprecedented movements in the region 
by examining the journeys, motivations and aspirations of 
refugees and migrants in Italy, Greece, Turkey and Malta.
Who is on the move?
2015 marked the sharpest rise in sea arrivals to the EU with a 
four-fold increase from 2014. 
Significant differences have developed in the magnitude and 
composition of the flows along the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes. There has been a dramatic increase 
in the numbers of people moving through the Eastern 
Mediterranean into Greece but little change from 2014 on 
the Central Mediterranean route to Italy.
The composition of flows has changed considerably, most 
notably the rapid decline in the arrival of Syrians into Italy who 
went from 24% of arrivals in 2014 to just 5% in 2015. This 
contrasts with Greece where Syrians make up 56% of all 
sea arrivals. The rate or deaths or missing people (number of 
deaths or missing per 1000 people) in the Mediterranean has 
fallen significantly in 2015 when compared with the 
preceding year. 
The migration of single family members through the Central 
Mediterranean route stands in stark contrast to the 
increasing migration of families crossing the Aegean from 
Turkey to Greece. Within our sample of 500 refugees and 
migrants the proportion of people travelling with their children 
is significantly higher on the Eastern Mediterranean 
compared with the Central Mediterranean route. 
Two thirds of our respondents have a secondary school or 
university education. For those arriving in Greece the level 
rose to 78%, of whom a third has a university education. 
Nearly three quarters (72%) of people were in employment 
before making the journey to Europe, and the proportion
is significantly higher among those arriving in Greece (87%) 
than those arriving in Italy (60%)
Why are people moving?
Although the increase in the scale of flows is partly  
associated with the deteriorating situation in Syria, it should 
be remembered that the drivers of migration to Europe are 
complex and multi-faceted.
84% of sea arrivals in 2015 came from the world’s top 10 
refugee producing countries, with Syrian nationals 
representing just over 50%. This means that the so-called 
‘migration crisis’ can be more accurately described as a 
crisis of refugee protection. 
Our emerging findings challenge ideas about the relationship 
between so-called ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors which underpin 
many of the responses to increased migration. Within our 
sample, mixed motivations are an important feature of 
individual migrant journeys.
Changes to migration policies and increased border controls 
have led to protracted and fragmented journeys and make 
it increasingly difficult for people to safely and legally access 
protection and employment.
Refugees and migrants have only partial information about 
migration policies in particular countries and decisions about 
where to go are usually made ad hoc, along the route. 
Flows, journeys and trajectories
Migration across the Mediterranean in 2015 has 
conventionally been perceived as one coherent flow. This is 
challenged by our emerging findings which indicate that both 
the nature of migration patterns and their magnitude reflect 
the merging of several flows. 
Migration into Europe is made up of distinct ‘sub-flows’ from 
many countries and regions and includes individuals with 
diverse trajectories. These flows merge in Turkey and Libya, 
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and it is this merging which partly explains the magnitude 
and continuation over recent months.
People’s migration trajectories are varied. Many people have 
previously been displaced or have been migrating for long 
periods of time. These longer trajectories are important in 
understanding the dynamics of migration into and through 
Europe. 
Policy implications
There have been policy failures in response to the movement 
of people across the Mediterranean. This is in part due to 
weaknesses of implementation, but policy failures also reflect 
flawed assumptions about the reasons why people move, 
the factors that shape their longer-term migration trajectories 
and their journeys to Europe.
The vast majority of people migrate across the Mediterranean 
by boat because they believe that their lives are in danger 
and/or that there is no future for themselves (and their  
children) in countries of origin and transit.
Deterrence policies without access to protection, 
resettlement or humanitarian assistance will simply drive 
demand for the services of smugglers who can facilitate 
access and will push people into taking ever more risky 
routes into and within Europe.
There is no evidence that search and rescue operations 
create a so-called ‘pull effect’.
There is a need for nuanced, tailored and targeted policy 
responses which reflect diverse, stratified and increasingly 
complex flows.
Key findings (cont.)
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Since September 2015 a team of researchers led by the 
Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry 
University working in collaboration with University of 
Birmingham’s Institute for Research into Superdiversity and 
the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at Oxford 
University in the UK and partners in Greece (ELIAMEP), 
Italy (FIERI), Turkey (Yasar University) and Malta (People for 
Change Foundation), has been undertaking research into the 
migration crisis at the borders of Southern Europe. 
In 2015 an estimated 1,011,712 people crossed the 
Mediterranean to Europe in search of safety and a better life1. 
3,770 are known to have died trying to make this journey2. 
Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) and the Department for International Development 
(DfID), the MEDMIG project examines the dynamics, 
determinants, drivers and infrastructures underpinning this 
recent migration across, and loss of life in, the Mediterranean. 
This research brief provides an overview of the research that 
has been undertaken to date. It summarises our emerging 
findings in relation to the dynamics of the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes, as well as the characteristics of those 
on the move and their journeys and trajectories. The brief 
also reflects on the implications on policy at the local, national 
and EU levels. 
Our project
Although large scale migration in Europe is nothing new, 
events over the last year have triggered a multi-faceted 
refugee, border, humanitarian and political crisis. Migration 
policy is currently driven by moral panic, patchy knowledge 
and broad assumptions about the people at the heart of the 
story: refugees and migrants themselves. There is a grave 
lack of knowledge about their motivations, aspirations and 
about the journeys and processes by which they come to 
arrive in the EU. 
Our project aims to better understand the processes which 
influence, inform and shape migration by speaking  
directly with those who crossed the Mediterranean in 2015 
and with the numerous state and non-state actors who create 
opportunities and constraints along the way. It provides 
the first large-scale, systematic and comparative study of 
the backgrounds, experiences, routes and aspirations of 
refugees and migrants in four European countries. Our team 
of researchers was based in the field from September to 
December 2015, observing events as they unfolded. During 
this time we interviewed 500 refugees and migrants 
travelling via the Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes: 
205 in Italy (Sicily, Apulia, Rome, Piedmont, Bologna) and 
20 in Malta (Central Mediterranean route); 220 in Greece 
(Athens, Lesvos) and 60 in Turkey (Izmir, Istanbul) (Eastern 
Mediterranean route). We also interviewed more than 100 
stakeholders, including politicians, policy makers, naval 
officers and coastguards, representatives of 
international, non-governmental and civil society 
organisations, as well as volunteers to gain broader insights 
into the experiences and journeys of the refugees and 
migrants with whom they come into contact.
These four countries enable a comparison of the 
backgrounds, experiences and aspirations of those using 
different routes and contribute to better understanding the 
ways that nationality, economic status and education, 
gender, ethnicity and age shape the journeys and 
experiences of refugees and migrants. This also enables us 
to investigate how migration flows respond to changing 
political opportunities and policy openings led by national 
governments and EU-wide initiatives. Within these countries 
the project employed a purposive sampling strategy to 
ensure that the backgrounds and demographic characteristics 
of respondents were broadly reflective of wider trends.
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1  See IOM (2016) Mixed Migration: Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond: Compilation of Available Data and Information 2015. Geneva: IOM (GMDAC) 
http://doe.iom.int/docs/Flows%20Compilation%202015%20Overview.pdf 
2  See http://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean. This is most likely an underestimate as many bodies are never recovered. This figure does not include 
those who died before arriving at the shores of the Mediterranean to make the crossing to Europe
3
The dynamics of the Central and Eastern 
Mediterranean routes
While irregular crossings in the Mediterranean to reach 
Europe have been growing for a number of years, 2015 
marked the sharpest rise in sea arrivals to the EU with a 
four-fold increase from 2014. Deaths at sea also reached 
record levels with over a 7.5% increase in people recorded as 
missing, believed drowned compared with the previous year. 
At least 30% of those who died were children.
But these headline figures conceal a rather more dynamic 
picture.
Over the course of 2015 significant differences developed in 
the magnitude and composition of the flows along the Central 
and Eastern Mediterranean routes. In Greece there was a 
rapid and largely unanticipated growth of arrivals from Spring 
2015, whereas along the Central Mediterranean route arrivals 
dropped by 13%, from around 150,000 in 2015 compared 
with 170,000 in 2014. These differences reflect changes in
the drivers of migration to Europe and the geographical 
proximity of the Greek islands to Turkey, a country to which 
millions of Syrians have fled due to the ongoing conflict in their 
country. 
On the two routes there are remarkably different profiles in 
terms of country of origin, gender and age for 2015.  
According to UNHCR data, of the 850,000 people arriving in 
Greece by sea in 2015, over 90% came from the world’s top 
10 refugee producing countries with 56% being Syrian 
nationals3. Aside from Syrians, most of those arriving in 
Greece are refugees from Afghanistan and Iraq3. This means 
that the so-called ‘migration crisis’ can be more accurately 
described as a crisis of refugee protection. 
The proportion of women and children travelling via the 
Eastern Mediterranean route also increased significantly 
during the course of the year, rising from 27% in September 
2017 to 60% by March 20164. 
Although the numbers arriving in Italy are not dramatically 
different in scale to those seen in 2014, the composition of 
flows has changed considerably. There has been a rapid 
decline in the presence of Syrian nationals who went from 
24% of arrivals in 2014 to just 5% in 2015. While Eritreans 
were the largest single nationality group in 2015, it is the 
presence of young single men from a wide range of African 
countries that truly characterises the Central Mediterranean 
route in 2015. The range of countries from which people 
travel is more diverse than in Greece, and includes Eritrea, 
Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia, Bangladesh, Mali and 
Senegal as well as Syria5. The relative absence of Syrians in 
Italy has had important implications in relation to the Italy’s 
positon in the EU’s refugee crisis, for example concerning 
Italy’s involvement in the EU relocation scheme.
3  UNHCR (2015a) World At War – UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/5683d0b56.html
4  See http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=83 
5  See http://doe.iom.int/docs/Flows%20Compilation%202015%20Overview.pdf
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At the same time, the increase in the number of people 
moving through the Eastern Mediterranean coincides with 
declining numbers of persons dead or missing during journeys 
across the Mediterranean in 2015 compared with the  
preceding year. The mortality rate (the relationship between 
arrivals and fatalities) has declined considerably, from 16 
missing or dead people for every 1000 sea arrivals in 2014, 
to 4 in 2015. Monthly data on those who are missing or dead 
by route suggests that this can be attributed to two main 
factors. One is the strengthening of search and rescue  
capabilities through the Triton Plus operation along the  
Central Mediterranean route. This came in April 2015  
following the deaths of up to 850 people when the boat  
carrying them sank 60 miles off the coast of Libya6. The other is 
the increase in journeys across the shorter, and comparatively 
 less dangerous, Aegean route from roughly the same period. 
The danger associated with the journey across the 
Mediterranean reflects a complex relationship between 
routes, policies and smuggler strategies. The impact of 
policies on the riskiness of journeys can be seen in the 
context of the Aegean in particular: many of those we spoke 
to expressed concern that increased efforts to reduce the 
number of boat crossings to Greece were leading smugglers 
to send boats at more dangerous times, for example at night 
or in poor weather conditions, when rescue attempts were 
less likely to be successful. The increase in the mortality 
rate of the Eastern Mediterranean route since January 2016 
raises questions about the impact of changing search and 
rescue practices, the militarisation of migration control and 
the occasional, but seemingly increasing criminalisation of 
volunteers and NGOs working on the Greek islands.
The other significant, and related, difference between the 
two routes concerns the mechanics of arrival, with 
so-called spontaneous arrivals de facto  disappearing from 
the Central Mediterranean route to be replaced by sea 
rescue operations. Our research shows that this has enabled 
Italy to develop a more managed approach to replace with 
those crossing the sea than that seen in Greece. It involves 
the distribution of new arrivals between a number of Italian 
ports and, in turn, a range of reception and processing 
centres. This explains, at least in part, why the journeys of 
those crossing the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy have 
captured rather less media and public attention. In addition, 
the Italian’s government’s decision to disembark almost all 
persons rescued in the Central Mediterranean in Italy 
explains why the number of sea arrivals in Malta has been so 
low in comparison to previous years (just 106)7. 
In contrast the Eastern Mediterranean route has been 
characterised unless very recently by the absence of a formal 
reception and rescue system. Arrivals of large numbers 
of people on the beaches of the Greek islands which are 
closest to the Turkish beaches have been spontaneous and 
the numbers have fluctuated significantly on a daily basis 
depending on the operations of the Turkish police and 
coastguard, weather conditions and wider geo-political 
factors, including EU policy negotiations with the Greek 
and Turkish governments. 
6  See https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-says-between-800-and-850-migrants-died-in-boat-capsizing-off-libya/2015/04/21/a8383770-e803-11e4-
    9767-6276fc9b0ada_story.html 
7  See http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2015-10-18/local-news/Italian-MEP-asks-Brussels-about-secret-Malta-Italy-migrants-for-oil-deal-6736143776 
Central Route (2015) Eastern Route (2015)
Deaths and Missing Persons in the Mediterranean 2015
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Data from IOM, Presentation by MEDMIG
Images of an uncontrolled situation in Greece and the 
onward journeys of people travelling through the Balkans and 
into the countries of Northern Europe (particularly Germany 
and Sweden) have not only captured the public imagination 
but have created significant challenges in terms of 
humanitarian assistance and appropriate policy responses, 
culminating most recently in the closure of the Macedonian 
border8 and the deal between the EU and Turkey to limit 
flows and accept returns in exchange for €6 billion euros and 
visa liberalisation9.
Who is on the move?
The differences in the composition of flows between the 
Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean routes are 
reflected in the characteristics of our research respondents. 
Although our sample is not intended, and does not claim, to 
be representative, the country of origin of those who were 
interviewed broadly reflects the characteristics of those 
moving through the different routes. 
In Greece our respondents come from nine different 
countries of origin: the largest proportion originates from 
Syria (45%), followed by Afghanistan (20.5%) and Iraq 
(13.5%). A further 10% come from Eritrea. Mirroring the 
marked diversity of countries of origin among sea arrivals, 
respondents from Italy came from 21 different countries and 
the largest groups in our sample are from Nigeria (20.5%), 
Gambia (20%), Ghana (10%), Pakistan (7.5%) and Eritrea 
(6.5%).
In terms of age, gender and whether people are travelling with 
their children we also see differences in each of the case study 
countries, some of which reflect broader trends. Just over two 
thirds (65%) of those who we interviewed were aged 18-29 
but the proportion was higher in Italy (76%) than in Greece 
(55%), reflecting the fact that those arriving in Greece are more 
likely to be older and travelling in family groups. 
There are also significant differences between the two routes 
in relation to those travelling with and without children. 
Across the sample as a whole, 39% have children and 17% 
are travelling with their children on the journey. However, the 
proportion of people from our sample travelling with their 
children is significantly higher on the Eastern Mediterranean 
compared with the Central Mediterranean route. Of those 
travelling to Europe via Turkey to Greece 41% have children, 
of whom half (50.5%) have their children travelling with them. 
This trend appears to be increasing: in the latter stages of 
our fieldwork in Greece we noticed that respondents referred 
more frequently to family members who were already in 
Northern Europe suggesting that a new wave of refugees is 
starting to join family members who have travelled previously. 
By contrast whilst around a third (31%) of those travelling 
from Libya to Italy and Malta have children, the vast majority 
(88.5%) have left them behind, usually with other family 
members. The migration of a single family member through 
the Central Mediterranean route stands in stark contrast to the 
increasing migration of families across the Aegean. 
Although just 13.5% of those we interviewed were women 
the percentage was slightly higher in Greece (17%). The low 
proportion of women in the sample is partly because men are 
more likely to make the long and risky journey to Europe than 
women, particularly the journey through Libya and from there 
to Italy10. Moreover, it also reflects the fact that men
more commonly put themselves forward to be interviewed
about the family’s experiences when travelling with wives, 
daughters and mothers. 
Our study shows that regardless of their country of origin, 
those crossing the Mediterranean had lives which included 
experiences of education and employment both before and 
sometimes during their journeys. Two thirds of our 
respondents have a secondary school or university education. 
For those arriving in Greece the level rises to 78%, of whom a 
8  See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6b4bd41e-c68f-11e5-808f-8231cd71622e.html#axzz41qPsDgFm 
9  See http://fortune.com/2016/03/17/eu-turkey-migrant-crisis-deal-disaster/
10  See https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/five-explanations-to-why-the-majority-of-refugees/ 
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third has a university education. This finding is in line with 
research conducted by UNHCR which similarly found that 
most Syrians coming to Greece were students11. Our initial 
analysis also indicates that nearly three quarters (72%) of  
people were in employment before making the journey to 
Europe, and the proportion is significantly higher among those 
arriving in Greece (87%) than those arriving in Italy (60%). 
This is most likely a reflection of the countries from which the 
respondents originate and the corresponding opportunities 
that had previously been available to them. Thus, refugees 
and migrants to Greece are generally better-educated and 
from higher socio-economic groups than in Italy.
Why are people moving?
Whilst helpful in providing a sense of the scale of the flows 
and an insight into their composition, numbers alone do not 
tell the real stories behind the journeys of those on the move. 
The drivers of migration to Europe are complex and 
multi-faceted.
The reason for the increase in flows across the Mediterranean 
over recent years lies, in large part, with the conflict in 
Syria. Although it began in March 2011, the conflict has 
escalated over the past five years and drawn in countries 
within and outside the region. It is also closely associated 
with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
But Syria is not the only country in which there is conflict and 
human rights abuse. In the past five years, multiple conflicts 
have erupted or reignited: there have been eight in Africa 
(Côte d’Ivoire, Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, north 
eastern Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, South 
Sudan and this year in Burundi), three in the Middle East 
(Iraq and Yemen as well as Syria), one in Europe (Ukraine) 
and three in Asia (Kyrgyzstan and in several areas of 
Myanmar and Pakistan). Eritrea has recently been described 
as one of the world’s fastest-emptying nations as a result 
of forced conscription on the one hand and poverty on the 
other12. Those fleeing conflict, civil unrest and persecution 
are joined by those moving for reasons of food insecurity 
(northern Mali and northern Nigeria) and unemployment (rest 
of Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Senegal). In 
2014 three quarters of refugees came from just ten countries, 
several of which are geographically proximate to Europe13. 
The presence of mixed migration flows, of people sometimes 
from one and the same country but with different motivations 
moving together in groups, has long been recognised as a 
feature of migration to Europe. However, the emerging  
findings of our research suggest that this process is e
ven more complex than previously assumed. In particular, 
understanding the reasons why people move has been  
complicated by changes to migration policies and increased 
border controls which make it increasingly difficult for  
refugees and migrants to safely and legally access protection 
and work. The result is increasingly protracted and  
fragmented journeys during which the circumstances of an 
individual or family can change, sometimes repeatedly14. 
Many of those who participated in our research told us that 
they had been forced to move as a result of conflict, human 
rights or persecution, others that they had moved primarily 
for economic reasons. For some both conflict and
economic reasons had motivated the decision to leave their 
home. Many Syrians, for example, told us that whilst they 
had left their country because of the war it was the 
11  See http://www.unhcr.org/5666ddda6.html 
12  http://www.wsj.com/articles/eritreans-flee-conscription-and-poverty-adding-to-the-migrant-crisis-in-europe-1445391364?alg=y 
13  UNHCR (2015a) World At War – UNHCR Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014, http://unhcr.org/556725e69.html
14  See also Collyer. M (2015) Conditions and Risks of Mixed Migration in North East Africa, MHub (North Africa Mixed Migration Task Force), 
     www.mixedmigrationhub.org/resources/mmtf-noah-research
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damage that had been done to the economy that had 
ultimately forced them to leave: they were simply unable to 
make a living and feed their families. Iraqis similarly reported 
that joblessness and the search for employment had been 
the primary motivation for the decision to leave, but these 
experiences cannot be understood outside of the ongoing 
conflict in the country. 
Our research also identified people from minority regions in 
a number of countries, including Hazaras from Afghanistan, 
Kurds from Iraq, Kurds from Syria, as well as marginalised 
social groups such as divorced women or orphans, for whom 
the reasons for leaving were different to those for other groups. 
Some of the difficulties experienced by policy makers in 
responding appropriately to the Mediterranean migration 
crisis have been caused by the assumption that it is possible 
to differentiate easily between those who can be categorised 
as ‘refugees’ and those who are ‘economic migrants’. But 
the emerging findings of our research also suggest that for 
many of those on the move the motivation for movement 
changes over time in response to the circumstances in which 
they find themselves. Many of those arriving in Italy, for 
example, come from countries in Africa in which it has proved 
very difficult to make a living. They left in order to work and 
some had done so for many years before being forced to 
move on due to conflict, persecution or discrimination. In 
other words, mixed motivations are a feature of individual 
migrant’s experiences and not just of migration flows. 
Our emerging findings also challenge ideas about the 
relationship between so-called ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors which 
underpin many of the policy responses to increased migration. 
It is frequently assumed that refugees and migrants 
are drawn towards particular countries by favourable policies 
relating to employment, welfare, education or housing. This 
assumption presupposes that people who move know and 
understand the nuances of migration policy and practice 
across a wide range of European Member States and that 
they can interpret, and make sense, of the implications of 
what are often rapidly changing policies for their particular 
individual and/or family circumstances, the country they 
come from, their experience and qualifications and their 
relationships with others. 
Finally, it appears from our initial analysis that refugees and 
migrants have only partial information about migration 
policies in particular countries. The decisions about where to 
go are also made ad hoc  along the route, and more often 
than not are based on a number of intervening variables and 
opportunities that arise on the journey or are communicated 
to them by agents and smugglers. We will be exploring this 
issue further through a more detailed analysis of the data.
Flows, trajectories and journeys
The irregular movement of people into Europe in 2015 has 
conventionally been perceived as one coherent flow. This 
perception is challenged by the emerging findings of our 
research which indicate that both the nature of migration 
patterns and their magnitude are the product of a merging 
of several flows. Moreover whilst public attention has been 
captured by particular crossings or border points, notably the 
crossing of the Mediterranean and Aegean seas and various 
border points along the Balkan route, our research has found 
that many interviewees had already been displaced or were 
migrating for longer periods of time. These longer trajectories 
are equally important in understanding the dynamics of 
migration into and through Europe. 
As noted above, movements through Turkey into Greece 
are dominated by Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis whilst through 
Libya to Italy the populations are more diverse and include 
Eritreans, Nigerians, Gambians, Somalis, Sudanese and 
many others. But within these flows we have identified 
diverse trajectories, partly representing ‘sub-flows’. There are
Syrians coming directly from Syria but there are others who 
left the Gulf countries where they had been labour migrants 
and others who were living as refugees in Lebanon or Turkey. 
Afghans may come directly from Afghanistan but also from 
Iran where often they have been residing for many years or 
from Turkey where they were previously living. 
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Eritreans may come directly from Eritrea but also from Sudan 
or Egypt or Rwanda (but indirectly via Israel) having spent a 
period of time working in these locations. Some Palestinians 
have previously been living in Syria, or indeed were born 
there but denied citizenship and have now been displaced 
for a second time. Some of those travelling from Libya had 
been living there as labour migrants or refugees for months 
if not years and were not necessarily transiting through that 
country, as is too often assumed. 
Thus migration patterns into Europe consist of separate 
‘sub-flows’ from many countries and regions and include 
individuals with diverse trajectories. These flows merge in 
Turkey and Libya, and it is this merging which partly explains 
the magnitude and continuation over time of the European 
refugee crisis.
Our initial analysis indicates that there are significant 
differences in the duration of the journey to Europe between 
those arriving through the Central and Eastern Mediterranean 
routes. For more than half (56%) of those crossing from 
Turkey to Greece, the journey time from the country of origin 
to arrival in Europe has been less than three months: for 
more than a third (37.5%) it is less than one month. By 
contrast just 1% of those arriving in Italy left their country of 
origin less than a month previously. For nearly half (46%) of 
those travelling through the Central Mediterranean route the 
journey to Europe is part of a longer trajectory lasting more 
than a year: the comparable figure for those travelling through 
the Eastern Mediterranean route is 26%.
Varied particular journeys between different sites connect 
refugee and migrants’ broader trajectories across Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Eritrea, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, 
Egypt, Mali and elsewhere. They are often not simple or 
straightforward, but rather evolving over different legs and 
separate stages, some regular and others irregular. They 
may also involve diverse modes of transportation including 
walking, taxis, buses, trains, trucks, boats, ferries and planes, 
each with specific challenges and risks.
Finally, the emerging findings of our research challenge the 
often simplistic depiction of facilitators as ruthless 
smugglers who are routinely endangering the lives of refugees 
and migrants. Almost all irregular journeys are facilitated by 
mostly local service providers (‘smugglers’). They can be 
found in the different sites on the journey, but also located 
on social media. Smuggling is based on a demand-supply 
mechanism and as long as there is demand certain agents 
will deliver. Fees seem negotiable and to have dropped since 
2014. In the case of the journey from Turkey to Greece, they 
are often only paid upon (safe) arrival and discounts may be 
offered to groups and families. Whilst there are many stories 
of violence and death on the journey, it is also clear that many 
smugglers provide the only opportunity to secure access to 
Europe in the absence of safe and legal routes for protection 
and work.
Policy issues
Multiple conflicts in Europe’s neighbourhood have triggered 
the arrival of an unprecedented number of people who have 
crossed the Mediterranean in search of protection and an 
opportunity to rebuild their lives. Whilst this was not 
unexpected, the EU was nevertheless taken by surprise. 
Repeated failures at coherently and cohesively dealing with 
the unfolding situation have triggered a multifaceted crisis: a 
refugee crisis, a crisis of border controls, a humanitarian crisis 
and even a geopolitical crisis within the EU itself. 
The EU has developed a mixture of policies which aim to  
address root causes, reinstate an orderly process of  
registration and reception and ensure responsibility–sharing 
between Member States. The EU has made efforts to 
facilitate peace talks in Syria, give development aid to mi-
grant-sending countries (the Khartoum process), enhance 
border controls (the EUNAVFOR operation as well as NATO 
and Frontex), tackle people smugglers (EU Action Plan), 
improve registration procedures (‘hotspots’), resettle
(from transit countries), relocate (from Italy, Greece and 
Hungary) and disperse across Member States (reforming the 
Dublin III Regulation), improve and/or accelerate asylum 
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procedures (in Greece and Germany respectively), to have 
migrants readmitted (to Turkey) and returned (e.g. to 
Afghanistan). Meanwhile, Turkey has introduced work 
permits for Syrians as part of a €6 billion deal with the EU to 
improve social conditions, which it is hoped will reduce the 
flows through the Eastern Mediterranean route. Most recently 
the EU has announced that all those arriving irregularly into 
Greece will be returned to Turkey.
Nonetheless after no fewer than five emergency summits and 
numerous bilateral discussions, a solution to Europe’s 
refugee crisis remains elusive. Many of the failures which 
have dominated media and public debate over recent 
months are failures of implementation. As these mount up, 
states have acted unilaterally and in regional blocs to build 
fences and keep people out.
Our analysis sheds light on the complexity of migration flows 
across the Mediterranean. It shows how they vary in terms 
of magnitude and composition across routes and over time. 
Our route-based analysis reveals significant diversity in terms 
of socio-economic, gender and age profiles between the 
Central and Eastern Mediterranean routes, but also points to 
intra-route variations over time. It reveals significant variations 
in terms of the drivers of migration and the logistics and 
duration of journeys. It also begins to unpack the dynamic 
relations between the drivers, opportunity structures and 
barriers to migration factors at various points along the 
journey. 
To address such diverse and composite flows requires a 
coherent policy response that is also nuanced, tailored and 
targeted. 
Deterrence policies aiming at immobilising people in countries 
of origin or transit without concomitant access to protection, 
resettlement or humanitarian assistance will simply increase 
the extent of human suffering. The absence or slow realisation 
of safe and legal access to protection (resettlement or family 
reunification) increases the demand for illicit services, and 
thus also the exposure of migrants to smugglers and crime: 
it pushes people into taking ever more risky routes into and 
within the EU.
Search and rescue operations contribute significantly to the 
prevention of death. This is illustrated by the rapid decrease 
in fatalities in the Central Mediterranean since April 2015, 
not to mention during the Italian Mare Nostrum Operation 
in 2014. Cutting back on such measures inevitably has the 
opposite effect, as early evidence of the increasing danger 
along the previously safer Aegean crossing shows. At the 
same time, a decrease in migration along the Central  
Mediterranean route, despite the presence of enhanced  
rescue operations there, demonstrates clearly that search 
and rescue operations do not create a pull effect.
Finally, the extent to which policies which are intended to deter 
refugees and migrants can have the effect that is intended or 
assumed is challenged by the ad hoc  and dynamic decision 
making processes of the people on the move. In particular, 
early evidence of informal family-reunion flows across the 
Eastern Mediterranean route run counter to restrictions on 
family reunion introduced recently in countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden and Germany. 
Further information
Further information about the MEDMIG project, past and 
forthcoming events and future outputs together with contacts 
details for all of the team members can be found on our 
website www.medmig.info 
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